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Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications
Corp. and Excite, Inc.: The Impact of Banner Ad Keying
on the Development of E-commerce.
Michael Wu*
INTRODUCTION
Electronic commerce (“e-commerce”) is the future of
1
business, not only for the United States, but also for the world.
Although it is still at an embryonic stage, e-commerce has the
2
potential to drive economic growth for many years to come.
Whether or not e-commerce will reach its full potential
correlates directly to the enforcement and application of law
and policy in this digital marketplace.
Law and policy
“decisions will have a major impact on the kind of environment
in which e-commerce will develop and should therefore be
crafted with care and with due recognition of its fragile and
3
As forming on-line businesses becomes
evolving nature.”
easier and as the boundaries of traditional markets begin to
blur, anti-competitive laws become more important to the

* J.D. Candidate 2001, University of Minnesota Law School. The
author would like to thank Ted Kittila, and the numerous other editors and
staff members who assisted him with this article. The author would also like
to thank Gina Tsai for all of her love and support.
1. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 9-11 (1999)
(explaining that e-commerce will change the way business is conducted);
George Anders, Click and Buy: Why – and Where – Internet Commerce is
Succeeding, WALL ST. J. INTERACTIVE ED. (visited Sep. 25, 2000)
<www.interactive.wsj.com/public/current/articles/SB912719949440084500.
htm> (stating that e-commerce has the potential to become a $1 trillion online
economy within the next ten years, and furthermore e-commerce will not only
affect the economy, but it “is part of a broader process of social change,
characterized by the globalization of markets, the shift towards an economy
based on knowledge and information, and the growing prominence of all forms
of technology in everyday life.”).
2. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, The Emerging Digital Economy
(visited Sept. 25, 2000) <www.ecommerce.gov/danintro.htm>.
3. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra note 1
at 12.
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4

development of e-commerce, and laws designed for the “bricks
and mortar” world need to be re-examined given the realities of
5
e-commerce.
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications
6
Corp., the court handed down a decision that could retard the
growth and potential of e-commerce. The defendants, Netscape
Communications
Corp.
and
Excite,
Inc.
(together,
“defendants”), operate Internet search engines that sell banner
7
advertisements. To increase the efficiency of the banner ads,
defendants programmed their search engines to link “key”
search terms to a pre-selected set of banner ads, which enable
8
them to provide context-sensitive advertising. One such set of
banner ads, adult entertainment ads, is keyed to a list of over
450 terms relating to adult entertainment, including the terms
9
“playboy” and “playmate.” When search engine users “key-in”
either of these terms, a banner ad for an adult entertainment
site appears on the search results page, along with plaintiff
10
11
PEI,
Playboy Enterprises, Inc.’s (“PEI”) web site address.
4. See id. at 21.
Many e-commerce products benefit from non-rivalry (one
person’s consumption does not limit or reduce the value of the
product to other consumers), network externalities (each
additional user of a product increases its value to other users),
and increasing returns to scale (unit costs decrease as sales
increase). These factors create an environment where producers
may seek to engage in practices that permit them to establish
themselves as the, or part of the, de facto standard. This can
hinder innovation and competition.
Id.
5. Id. at 22.
6. 55 F. Supp.2d 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
7. See id. at 1072. Users of Internet search engines will key-in specific
terms in order to find specific sites. See id. Using these terms, the search
engine will compile a list of sites that either match or are related to such
terms, and place them on the “search results” page. See id. The banner
advertisements are placed at the top of these search results pages. See id.
8. See id.
9. Id. (stating that defendants allow advertisers to increase the efficiency
of their ads, through targeting certain demographic groups, by linking ads to
the users’ search terms, which is accomplished by linking specific search
terms to a pre-selected group of banner ads). Because there were many
advertisers subscribing to such service, the ads from various advertisers were
displayed on a rotating basis. See id. at 1078.
10. PEI is the leading publisher of adult entertainment and its
trademarks are recognized worldwide. PEI’s trademarks “Playboy” and
“Playmate” are registered with the United States Patent and Trademark
Office and the trademarks are valid and subsisting. See id. at 1076. PEI first
registered its Playboy trademark in 1954 and its Playmate trademark in 1961.
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alleging that such practice infringed upon and diluted its
12
trademarks, moved for a preliminary injunction, which the
13
district court denied.
PEI appealed, but the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
14
court’s decision.
The issue raised here is whether banner ad keying, as used
by the defendants, constitutes trademark infringement or
dilution. The Ninth Circuit’s holding is important because if it
stands, it will be a major setback for e-commerce. By allowing
companies to use their rivals’ trademarks for the purpose of
selecting banner ads, the court would potentially allow these
businesses to free ride off of the goodwill and reputation of
15
their rivals, which undermines the purpose of trademark law.
This is significant because it may discourage companies from
conducting business over the Internet. The future of e16
commerce will be shaped by businesses, and if they are not
afforded trademark protection in the digital economy, they may
be hesitant to participate in it or to fully utilize it. Moreover, a
major concern of companies, with respect to conducting
business on-line, is whether a predictable legal environment for
17
Here, the Ninth
doing business will exist on the Internet.
Circuit affirmed a district court decision that, given the weight
See id. In 1997, PEI spent over $46,500,000 in advertising and reached net
sales in excess of $296,622,000. See id.
11. See id. at 1078.
12. See id. at 1072. Playboy argued that its trademark was infringed
upon and diluted by defendants when (1) defendants sold a group of words,
including the words “playboy” and “playmate,” to advertisers; (2) programmed
adult entertainment banner ads to run in response to the words “playboy” or
“playmate”; and (3) actually displayed such banner ads on the search results
page. See id.
13. See id. at 1070. The District Court judge held that PEI: failed to
establish that defendants used its trademark (as opposed to ordinary English
words) in interstate commerce; did not demonstrate that a likelihood of
confusion existed; and failed to show trademark dilution. See id. The court
also held that the First Amendment protected the defendants’ use of those
words and defendants’ use of the words was protected by the doctrine of fair
use. See id.
14. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 202 F.3d
278 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding, without oral argument, that the District Court
did not abuse its discretion by denying the preliminary injunction, and that it
did not rely on erroneous legal premises).
15. See infra Section I Part B(3): Free Riding.
16. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra
note 1, at 12.
supra
17. See
U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
note
2,
<www.ecommerce.gov/danc8.htm>, at 1.
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of authority, should have been overruled. Courts must apply
19
the laws in light of the realities of e-commerce. If they are
applying the laws inconsistently, it may deter business
participation in the digital marketplace and thus substantially
20
hamper the growth of e-commerce.
This comment will examine whether the district court
properly applied federal trademark law in the realm of
cyberspace and will maintain that the court erred in its
rationale by holding that the defendants used generic, English
words, as opposed to PEI’s trademarks. Section I will list and
describe the relevant precedent; section II will discuss the
court’s holding and rationale; and section III will analyze and
critique this rationale. This comment will conclude that not
only should the holding be overruled, but that the use of banner
ad keying should be restricted and should be subject to the fair
use doctrine.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Background section consists of two parts. Part A
discusses the precedent concerning trademark infringement
and trademark dilution, the two claims brought by PEI, and
the court’s reasoning in the case. Part B discusses related
issues, including meta-tags, domain names, free riding,
trademark vigilance, and the Internet. Part B also analyzes
the legal, economic and policy arguments for the restriction of
banner ad keying, as practiced by the defendants.
A.

TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND TRADEMARK DILUTION

1.

Preliminary Injunction

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act grants preliminary
injunctive relief when the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the
plaintiff will likely succeed on the merits, (2) absent an
injunction the plaintiff may suffer irreparable injury, (3) the
18. See generally Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Asiafocus Int’l, Inc., 1998 WL
724000, at *3, *6-*7 (E.D.Va. Apr. 10, 1998); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Calvin
Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997). Both courts found that
the defendants’ use of the words “playboy” or “playmate” was an infringement
on PEI’s trademarks.
19. See infra Section I Part B(5): Internet Regulation Generally.
20. See id.
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scale of hardship tips in the plaintiff’s favor, and (4) it is in the
21
public interest to grant the injunction.
Because courts
assume that society values fair competition and the protection
of trade names, if the plaintiff demonstrates that it will likely
succeed on the merits, two things follow: (1) it will be presumed
that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury, and (2) that
22
granting an injunction will be in the public interest.
Therefore, the two main parts of the test are whether the
plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits and whether the
relative harm to the plaintiff, if the injunction is denied,
outweighs the harm to the defendant if the injunction is
23
granted.
2. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
a. Trademark Infringement
A plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits depends on
whether it can show that it uses and owns the trademark, that
defendant is using plaintiff’s trademark or a similar one, and
that defendant’s use of the trademark harms plaintiff by
24
causing a likelihood of consumer confusion. The first element
can be satisfied by the plaintiff’s registration with the Principal
Register in the Patent and Trademark Office. Registration is
prima facie evidence of a trademark’s validity and entitles the
holder of the mark to exclusive use and ownership of that
25
mark. The second element, whether the defendant is using

21. See Alta Vista Corp., Ltd. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 44 F. Supp.2d 72, 75
(D. Mass. 1998); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Ent Corp.,
174 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F.
Supp.2d 1098, 1101 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
22. See Alta Vista Corp., 44 F. Supp.2d at 75 (citing Hypertherm, Inc. v.
Precision Products, Inc., 832 F.2d 697, 700 (1st Cir. 1987)). See also Calamari
Fisheries, Inc. v. The Village Catch, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 994, 1015 (D. Mass.
1988) (arguing that it is in the public interest to prevent consumer confusion);
Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1066 (citing Metro Pub., Ltd. v.
San Jose Mercury News, 987 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that:
“[o]nce the plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of confusion, it is ordinarily
presumed that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief is
not granted.”)).
23. See Calamari Fisheries, Inc., 698 F. Supp. at 1005.
24. See Alta Vista Corp., 44 F. Supp.2d at 76.
25. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1047; Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a) (2001).
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the plaintiff’s trademark, depends on the facts of each case.
The third element, the likelihood of confusion as to the source
27
of the goods or service, is the most important element of
trademark infringement. This is because an important goal of
trademark law is to prevent customer confusion as to the
source of products (i.e., a competitor using a similar trademark
28
to misappropriate the holder’s goodwill).
Courts will consider several factors in assessing the
likelihood of confusion, the most common factors include the
following: similarity of the trademarks, relatedness or
proximity of the products or services, strength of the plaintiff’s
mark, the relationship between the parties’ marketing
channels, the degree of care likely to be exercised by
consumers, actual confusion, and the defendant’s intent in
29
These factors are pliant, in that
selecting the trademark.
26. See id.
27. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1053. The statute
states that:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, . . . uses
in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which—(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person
with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his
or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, . . .
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she
is or is likely to be damaged by such act.

Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1125(a)(1) (2001).
28. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1053. The court
described the purpose of trademark law as follows:
[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying
mark, “reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchase
decisions,” for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that
this item—the item with this mark—is made by the same producer as
other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the
past. At the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not
an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related
rewards associated with a desirable product.

Id. at 1053 (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64
(1995)).
29. See Alta Vista Corp., Ltd., 44 F. Supp.2d at 76-77 (applying the
Pignons test which weighs the similarity of the marks, the similarity of the
goods, the relationship between the parties’ channels of trade, the relationship
between the parties’ advertising, the classes of prospective purchasers,
evidence of actual confusion, the defendant’s intent in adopting its mark, and
the strength of the plaintiff’s mark); Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174
F.3d at 1054 (citing Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d
1394 (9th Cir. 1997)) (applying the Sleekcraft factors, which include the
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some are more important than others, and the relative
30
importance of each factor will depend on the facts of the case.
Moreover, a likelihood of confusion can often be found after
31
examining only a few of these factors.
b. The Similarity of the Trademarks
Generally, the similarity of the trademarks should be
evaluated “in their entirety and as they appear in the
32
marketplace.” The greater the similarity between two marks,
33
when considering the “sight, sound, and meaning” of the
marks, the greater the likelihood of confusion.
c. The Relatedness or Proximity of the Products or Services
If the products or services are closely related, then it is
more likely that the public will be confused as to which
34
Courts should not place too much
company supplies them.
weight on the minute differences in the main lines of business:
“[T]he relatedness of each company’s prime directive isn’t
35
relevant.” What is relevant is whether the public is likely to,
in some way, associate the defendant’s products or services

similarity of marks, the relatedness of product offerings, the overlap in
marketing and advertising channels, the strength of the plaintiff’s mark, the
intent of the defendant, evidence of actual confusion, likelihood of expansion in
product lines, and consumer care); Metro Pub., Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury
News, 987 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying an eight factor test: (1)
strength of alleged infringed mark; (2) proximity or relatedness of the goods;
(3) similarity of sight, sound, and meaning of the marks; (4) evidence of actual
confusion; (5) degree of the marketing channels’ coverage; (6) type of goods and
degree of consumer care; (7) intent of defendant; and (8) likelihood parties will
expand their product lines).
30. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1054.
31. See id.
32. Id. See also Alta Vista Corp., Ltd., 44 F. Supp.2d at 76 (citing Calvin
Klein Cosmetics Corp., v. Lenox Lab., 815 F.2d 500, 504 (8th Cir. 1987)). In
Calvin Klein Cosmetics, the court noted that “[a] realistic evaluation of
consumer confusion must attempt to recreate the conditions in which buying
decisions are made, and the court should try to determine not what it would
do, but what a reasonable purchaser in market conditions would do.” 815 F.2d
at 504.
33. Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1054 (citing Airline
Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir. 1993)).
34. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1056.
35. Id. (quoting Dreamworks Prod. Group v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d
1127,1131 (9th Cir. 1988)).
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with those of the plaintiff.
Although there may be some
differences between the products or services, if these
differences are obscured in the marketplace, a likelihood of
37
confusion will exist.
d. The Strength of Plaintiff’s Trademark
A trademark’s “strength” refers to “the distinctiveness of
the mark, or more precisely, its tendency to identify the goods
sold under the mark as emanating from a particular . . .
38
The strength of a trademark is measured by the
source.”
likelihood that the public will remember it and associate it with
39
the trademark’s owner. Generally, the more money spent on
advertising, the stronger the trademark becomes and the more
40
protection it is entitled to.

36. See id. Even though companies were not in direct competition, the
nature and similarity of services provided would likely cause customer
confusion. See id. For example, two companies might provide adult
entertainment products and services. See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Feinberg, 26 F.
Supp.2d 639, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Although one provides “hard core images”
and the other “soft core images,” their principle line of business is the same.
See id. In the case of guns and toys, the distinction is much greater and the
likelihood of confusion is less. See id. (holding that there was “no likelihood of
confusion between ‘gunsrus.com’ firearms web site and ‘Toys ‘R’ Us’
trademark.”).
37. See Eli Lilly & Co., v. Natural Answers, Inc., 86 F. Supp.2d 834, 842
(S.D. Ind. 2000).
38. See id. at 843.
39. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1058.
40. See id. See also Alta Vista Corp., Ltd., 44 F. Supp.2d at 79 (noting
that the stronger the trademark, the more protection it is entitled to).
According to Alta Vista Corp., there are five factors that can be considered in
determining the strength of a mark. See id. Those factors are: (1) whether the
mark was registered, (2) whether it was used for a long time, (3) whether it
was widely advertised, (4) whether it was well-known in its field of business,
and (5) whether it has a strong “secondary meaning.” See id. See also Digital
Equipment Corp. v. Alta Vista Technology, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 478 (D.
Mass. 1997); see, e.g., Alta Vista Corp., Ltd., 44 F. Supp.2d at 80 (citing
Winship Green, 103 F.3d 196, 206 (mentioning factors (1) and (3)); Star
Financial, 89 F.3d 5,11 (mentioning factors (2), (3), and (4)); DeCosta v.
Viacom Intern., Inc., 981 F.2d 602, 606 (describing factor (5), and relying on
factor (5)).
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e. The Relationship Between the Parties’ Marketing
Channels
When the plaintiff and the defendant use the same
marketing channels, a likelihood of confusion exists. The
likelihood of confusion only increases when the marketing or
advertising channel used is the Internet because users can
easily move from one web site to another, regardless of whether
41
the web sites are related.
f.

The Degree of Care Likely to be Exercised by Consumers

The degree of care likely to be exercised by each consumer
42
is important in determining the likelihood of confusion.
Generally, the more expensive the product or service, the more
careful the consumer will be in determining whose product or
43
Thus, the less expensive the
service he or she is seeking.
product or service, the less careful the consumer will be and the
44
likelihood of confusion will increase.
g. Actual Confusion
If actual confusion can be demonstrated, then the
likelihood of confusion is apparent; however, it is often difficult
45
Generally, actual
to prove that actual confusion exists.
confusion need not be shown if other factors demonstrate a
41. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1057. Web users are
easily moved from one site to another (a click of the mouse) and are more
likely to be confused as to who owns a site than “traditional patrons of a brickand-mortar store would be of a store’s ownership.” Id. Examples of such
confusion include: customers incorrectly believing that the defendants’ banner
ads are sponsored by the plaintiff, that defendant’s companies licensed their
images from plaintiff, or that they are related companies. See id.
42. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1060. The court also
notes that “[t]he standard of care to be exercised by the reasonably prudent
purchaser will be equal to that of the least sophisticated consumer.” See id.
(quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motors Prods., 930 F.2d 277, 283 (3rd Cir.
1991)).
43. See id. (concluding that the reasonably prudent consumer is expected
to be more careful and less easily confused when purchasing expensive items
and when products or services are marketed to knowledgeable buyers).
44. See id.
45. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1050. The inability
to prove actual confusion, however, is not required, because it is very difficult
to prove. See id.
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likelihood of confusion.

h. The Defendant’s Intent in Selecting the Trademark
If it is found that the defendant intended to cause
confusion, this may be the most important indicator of a
47
If an infringer has the “intent of
likelihood of confusion.
deriving benefit from the reputation of the trade-mark or
tradename, [the infringer’s] intent may be sufficient to justify
48
the inference that there are confusing similarities.” Proof of
the defendant’s intent to deceive the public also implies
49
confusion. Although a finding of intent is strong evidence of
confusion, the lack of intent is “largely irrelevant in
50
determining if consumers likely will be confused as to source.”
While the above factors can be used to find a likelihood of
confusion, there is an alternative theory to finding confusion.
The alternative theory is known as initial interest confusion,
which is the use of another’s trademark “in a manner
calculated ‘to capture initial consumer attention, even though
no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the
51
With respect to e-commerce, the harm to
confusion . . . .’”
plaintiff is the probability that the user will subscribe to the
competitor’s site because the user thought it was in some way
connected to plaintiff’s site. The competitor would thereby
attract users based on the reputation and goodwill established
52
by the plaintiff.

46. See Eli Lilly & Co., 86 F. Supp.2d at 844-45.
47. See id. at 845.
48. Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1059.
49. See id.
50. Id. (quoting Daddy’s Junky Music Store, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Family
Music Center, 109 F.3d 275, 287 (6th Cir. 1997)).
51. Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1062 (quoting Dr. Seuss
Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir.
1997)).
52. See id. at 1063. Actual or potential confusion is not required at the
time of purchase, to find trademark infringement. See id. The issue is not the
possibility that an online user would subscribe to the defendants’ advertisers’
sites thinking they were actually PEI’s sites or that they had some connection
with PEI. The harm to PEI, rather, is the likelihood that the online user,
seeing the defendants’ advertisers’ banner ads and thinking they had some
connection with PEI, would consider them on that basis alone.
The
defendants’ advertisers would thus attract online users based solely on the
reputation built up by PEI. See id.
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The Lanham Act protects against the diversion of a user’s
53
initial interest.
Many courts hold that initial interest
confusion is actionable under the Lanham Act and that federal
trademark and unfair competition laws protect against this
54
kind of confusion. A plaintiff can prevail if it is shown that
similarities between its products or services and defendant’s
products or services mistakenly resulted in consumer belief
55
that the companies were related. The plaintiff must further
show that the confusion formed an interest in the defendant’s
56
company’s products, which otherwise would not have existed.
Pre-sale confusion is actionable and generally occurs when “an
infringing use is likely to attract potential customers based on
57
the reputation of the owner of the mark.”
3. Trademark Dilution
58

Trademark dilution
occurs when a famous mark’s
capacity to identify and distinguish its goods and services has
59
been diminished. The goal of a trademark dilution claim is to
prevent the distinctiveness of a holder’s trademark from being
eroded by the sale of a competitor’s goods or services under an
60
identical name. In order to prevail on a trademark dilution
claim, the plaintiff must show that:
53. See id.
54. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1063 (citing, e.g.,
Green Prods., Co. v. Independence Corn By-Products Co., 992 F. Supp. 1070,
1076 (N.D. Iowa 1997)) (holding that ICBP profited from the similarity
between Green Products’ trademark and ICBP’s domain name, which lured
customers onto its web site).
55. See id.
56. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1063.
57. Jeffrey R. Kuester & Peter A. Nieves, Hyperlinks, Frames and Metatags: An Intellectual Property Analysis, 38 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 243, 248-49
(1998).
58. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), § 43 (c)(1) (2001). This section
states that:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of
equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an
injunction against another person’s commercial use in commerce of a
mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become
famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to
obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection.

Id.
59. See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F.
Supp.2d 1070, 1075 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2001).
60. See Eli Lilly & Co., 86 F. Supp.2d. at 847.
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(1) [defendants have] made use of a junior mark sufficiently similar to
the famous mark to evoke in a relevant universe of consumers a mental
association of the two that (2) has caused (3) actual economic harm to
the famous mark’s economic value by lessening its former selling power
61
as an advertising agent for its goods and services.

Trademark dilution usually occurs when the famous mark
62
has been tarnished or blurred. Trademark tarnishment occurs
when the plaintiff’s mark is “associated improperly with an
63
inferior or offensive product or service.” Trademark blurring
occurs when the defendant uses the plaintiff’s mark to identify
64
the defendant’s goods and services, because when consumers
see plaintiff’s trademark on several different products or
services, the trademark’s ability to identify the plaintiff’s
65
product is weakened or diluted.
4.

Irreparable Harm

Irreparable harm is usually presumed in both trademark
infringement and dilution claims when a likelihood of confusion
66
is shown. If a plaintiff can show that there is a likelihood of
confusion or that he or she is likely to succeed on the merits,
courts should presume “irreparable harm from [the] deceptive
67
comparative advertising.”
5.

Balance of Harms

A court will likely grant an injunction, if in light of the
likelihood of succeeding on the merits, the harm to the plaintiff
without the injunction exceeds the harm to the defendant with
68
the injunction.

61. See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1075.
62. See Eli Lilly & Co., 86 F. Supp.2d. at 851.
63. Playboy Enters., Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at 1075. See also Eli Lilly & Co.,
86 F. Supp.2d. at 851 (noting that trademark tarnishment occurs when a
trademark is associated with poor quality products, “portrayed in an
unwholesome light,” or can no longer be a “wholesome identifier” of the
plaintiff’s product).
64. See Eli Lilly & Co., 86 F. Supp.2d. at 851.
65. See id.
66. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. See also Metro Pub., 987
F.2d at 640.
67. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. See also Metro Pub., 987
F.2d at 640; Abbott Laboratories v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11-12
(7th Cir. 1992).
68. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Public Interest

If a likelihood of confusion is shown, courts will presume
that it is in the public interest to grant the injunction. The
public interest favors enforcing the trademark laws in order to
prevent confusion because society values fair competition and
69
the protection of trade names.
B. RELATED ISSUES
A web site that is rarely visited does not provide a lot of
value to the business that created the site. Consequently,
nearly every business with a web site seeks to increase the
number of visits to its web site. With the rapid growth of ecommerce has come an increase in the competition for
70
attention. This section discusses some of the practices used to
attract attention and the related legal issues.
1.

Meta-tags

Although some consumers find web sites by memorizing
71
their URLs and typing them into the browser directly, most
consumers find web sites via search engines, such as Excite,
Lycos, or Hotbot. Many search engines will use a meta-tag’s
name and attributes to create an index of World Wide Web
72
pages. When a search engine user keys in a word or phrase
69. See id.
70. See Bruce E.H. Johnson, Regulatory Update: Internet Sheriffs
Approach the Electronic Frontier, 579 PLI/Pat 67, 85 (1999).
71. See id. This usually only occurs with respect to well-known web sites
such as www.etrade.com, www.amazon.com, or www.espn.com.
72. See id. at 87. Generally:
[a] Web page is a text file with instructions that tells a browser such as
Internet Explorer or Netscape how to display its contents. These
instructions for the browser are, for the most part, . . . given in the form
of certain “tags” or elements which are strings of text in between
brackets like <and>.

Id. at 86. For example, “the tag that tells a browser to display text in bold is
<b>: the instruction <b>Some random text</b> instructs the browser to
display the phrase ‘Some Random Text’ in bold.” Id. The tag that causes
trademark infringement and dilution problems is <meta>, which is contained
in the “head” of the HTML page. Purveyors of adult entertainment can use
the meta-tag as follows: <META NAME=“keywords” CONTENT=“Playboy,
Playmate, etc.”>, even though it actually is not related to PEI and does not sell
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and runs the search, the search engine will search its index for
73
the web sites that contain such word or phrase. The metatag’s name and attributes can have a significant effect on the
74
search engines; the meta-tag determines how high on the
relevancy ranking a company’s web site address will be relative
75
to other web sites on the search results page. Thus, meta-tags
are important in the digital marketplace because they assist
on-line users in arriving at their desired web sites. A business
can encode its web sites with meta-tags of the company’s name,
products or services, which allows customers to easily find the
business’s web site. However, companies have also found ways
76
to abuse the use of meta-tags.
Two questionable methods of generating attention to the
web sites are: (1) burying certain code in the meta-tag to
confuse search engines as to the source or content of a web
77
site, and (2) manipulating the content of the meta-tags so that
web site owners can get favorable positioning on the search
78
results page. Moreover, courts have consistently held that the
embedding of a competitor’s trademarks into one’s meta-tag
79
can be trademark infringement. The Lanham Act provides a
PEI products. When the search engine searches its index, it will list this site
along with PEI’s on the search results page, even though, this site has nothing
to do with PEI. See id.
73. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
74. See Johnson, supra note 70, at 86. Johnson quotes another author
stating that “[w]hen encountered by any of the popular search engines on the
Web, these keywords [in the meta tags] will be used to categorize the
document. If you want your documents to be indexed by a search engine,
consider putting this kind of tag [at the top] of each document.” Id. at 87.
75. See id. Basically, the meta-tags determine whether the web site is
ranked 1-10, or 100-110. Usually consumers will only look at the first few
listed web-sites.
76. See id.
77. For example, a purveyor of adult entertainment can put “playboy” and
“playmate” in its meta-tag, and when a user searching for PEI’s web site keys
in either “playboy” or “playmate,” the web site of the purveyor of adult
entertainment will appear next to or close to PEI’s web site, even though the
former’s web site is unrelated to PEI and has nothing to do with it. See
Johnson, supra note 70, at 86.
78. For example, a purveyor of adult entertainment can put “playboy,
playboy, playboy” and “playmate, playmate, playmate” in its meta-tag; when
the search engine looks for the word “playboy” or “playmate,” it will find this
site and list it at the top of the search results page. The search engine ranks
the web sites according to the number of “hits” (times it finds the words
“playboy” or “playmate”). See id. at 87.
79. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1064 (citing Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Asiafocus Int’l, Inc., 1998 WL 724000, at *3, *6-*7 (E.D. Va.
Apr. 10, 1998)) (concluding that AsiaFocus’s use of words “Playboy” and
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cause of action against one who uses a mark in commerce that
will likely cause confusion concerning the source of the
80
products or services offered.
In fact, it appears that the
Lanham Act prohibits the use of “any term confusingly similar
with [another’s trademark]” in one’s meta-tags not comporting
81
with the fair use doctrine under the Lanham Act.
The Lanham Act does permit the truthful use of a
competitor’s mark to identify the competitor’s products or
82
but a
services and in comparative advertisements,
presumption of unfair use of a trademark accompanies the use
83
of a trademark in a meta-tag. However, in Playboy Enters.,
84
Inc., Welles’ web site minimized the use of Playboy’s
trademark and contained disclaimers stating that the site was
not affiliated with Playboy. The Ninth Circuit held that
Welles’s used the words “playboy” and “playmate” as
descriptive words, not as trademarks, and that the use was a
85
“good faith attempt to index the content of her web site.”
Thus the court concluded her use of the words in her meta-tags
86
constituted fair use.
Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Sections 1115(b)(4) and 1125(c)(4),
the defendant has a fair use defense when the use of another’s
mark “also describes a person, place, or an attribute of a
87
product.” The fair use defense prohibits a trademark holder
“Playmate” in its HTML code “intentionally misled viewers into believing that
its Web site was connected with, or sponsored by Playboy.”); Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220, 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
(finding that Playboy had shown a success on its merits in its claim that
Calvin Designer Label’s use of the word playboy in its meta-tags constituted
trademark infringement, and consequently enjoining Calvin Designer Label
from using Playboy’s trademarks in its buried code or meta-tags). Cf. Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp.2d 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that the
defendant, a Playboy “Playmate of the Year,” was entitled to use of her title in
her web site’s “meta-tag”).
80. See generally Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1036.
81. See id. at 1065.
82. See New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302,
306-09 (9th Cir. 1992).
83. See Cosmetically Sealed Indus. v. Chesebrough-Pound’s USA, Co., 125
F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(4) that “fair use is a use,
otherwise than as a mark, of a term or device that is descriptive of and used
fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of a party”).
84. 7 F. Supp.2d 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
85. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp.2d 1098, 1101 (S.D. Cal.
1998).
86. See id.
87. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 302, (9th Cir.1992). See also 15
U.S.C. §1115(b)(4) (2001). When the “mark is used only to ‘describe the goods
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from appropriating a term for his own exclusive use, thereby
preventing others from properly and in good faith describing
88
the character of their goods or services.
A plaintiff must
overcome the fair use defense before a violation of section 43(a)
89
or 43(c) of the Lanham Act may be found.
2.

Domain Names

A domain name serves as a company’s on-line address and
90
is also subject to abuse by competitors. Such abuse can occur
when a competitor uses a company’s trademark(s) in its own
domain name, so as to confuse consumers into believing that
91
the competitor is in some way associated with the company.
This type of use has been held to be a misappropriation of a
92
company’s goodwill.
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin
Designer Label, the court held that the defendant could not use
the
domain
names:
“www.playboyxxx.com”
or
93
The court decided that, among
“www.playmatelive.com.”
other things, PEI was likely to prove trademark infringement
based on defendant’s use of the trademarks in its domain
94
The court also ordered the defendant to cease: (1)
name.
using PEI’s trademark in any domain name; (2) using PEI’s
trademark in connection with defendant’s good or services
which would cause an erroneous belief that it was associated
with the mark; (3) using any web sites, advertisements, or
Internet codes that are so similar to PEI’s mark as to cause
consumer confusion; and (4) engaging in activities which could
cause consumers to believe that PEI sponsored or authorized
or services of [a] party, geographic origin,’ trademark law recognizes a ‘fair
use’ defense,” which states the following:
That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement
is a use otherwise than as a mark, of the party’s individual name in his
own business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such
party, or of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and
in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party, or their
geographic origin . . . .

See id.
88. See Playboy Enters., Inc., 7 F. Supp.2d at 1103.
89. See id.
90. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp.
1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
91. See id. at 1220.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 1221.
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95

Free Riding

One of the goals of trademark law is to prevent companies
from free riding on their rivals’ trademarks and thus
96
capitalizing on their rival’s investments in time and money. A
trademark holder’s rivals have much incentive to “tread closely
on the heels of [a] very successful trademark” (i.e., it is cheaper
selling the product in an established market, without
97
advertising costs, etc.). Trademark holders are given the right
98
to enjoin others from continuing such misrepresentations.
Without the trademark holder’s right to prevent
misrepresentations, rival companies could “induce customers to
select their goods when the customers meant to select the goods
99
Thus, without
of the company that created the mark.”
protection from the law, there is no incentive to develop new
100
products
and
services,
which
harms
consumers.
Furthermore, the Lanham Act gives a strong mark greater
protection from free riders than it does to a weaker mark; a
strong mark may increase the likelihood of confusion, since
consumers may be less careful when purchasing a product with
101
a strong mark.
In the digital world, free riding may be one of the biggest
concerns facing companies today. Free riding is much easier on
the Internet, as opposed to in the “bricks and mortar” world,
simply because of the way information is used. Meta-tags,
domain names, and banner ads all allow potential free riding
95. See id. at 1222.
96. See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 306; Weight Watchers Int’l,
Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1259, 1269 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1990).
97. See Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Industries, Inc., 963 F.2d
350 at 352 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
98. See TMT North America, Inc. v. Magic Touch, 124 F.3d 876, 881-82
(7th Cir. 1997).
99. Id.
100. See TMT North America, Inc., 124 F.3d at 882 (citing William A.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30
J.L. & ECON. 265, 270 (1987) (stating “[i]f the law does not prevent it, free
riding may therefore eliminate the incentive to develop a valuable trademark
in the first place.”)).
101. See Kenner Parker Toys, Inc., 963 F.2d at 353 (concluding that the
“Lanham Act’s tolerance for similarity between competing marks varies
inversely with the fame of the prior mark. As a mark’s fame increases, the
Act’s tolerance for similarities in competing marks falls.”).
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102

by competitors, if they are not duly restricted.
4.

Trademark Vigilance

The court’s holding in the instant case may make it harder
for companies to defend their trademarks against potential
infringement by making it harder to exercise trademark
vigilance. Trademark vigilance is a company’s ongoing process
103
The
of detecting and fighting trademark infringement.
purpose of trademark vigilance is to prevent a strong mark
104
Effective vigilance will protect and
from becoming weak.
105
strengthen the trademark.
It is important to be vigilant
especially in a market where there are many infringers,
because if a company is not vigilant it may lose its rights to a
106
Moreover, a company’s ability to show that it
trademark.
102. Meta-Tags: A defendant free rides off plaintiff’s trademark when
defendant uses plaintiff’s trademark to attract customers. For example, free
riding occurs if D incorporates P’s trademark into D’s meta-tags. This
happens when C, using a search engine to find P’s product, types in P’s
trademark, arrives at a search results page with D’s web site address listed
near or before P’s web site, and chooses D’s web site, rather than P’s web site.
Domain names: A defendant can free ride off plaintiff’s trademark by using
plaintiff’s trademark within defendant’s domain name in order to attract
customers. A popular way of searching for a particular web site is to type in
“www.(name of the company/product).com.” For example, free riding occurs if
D uses P’s trademark in D’s domain name, for instance: “www.P.com,” and if C
doesn’t know P’s domain name, but guesses that it is “www.P.com,” C will be
taken to D’s web site, rather than P’s web site.
Banner Ads: A defendant can free ride off plaintiff’s trademark by using the
trademark in defendant’s banner ads in order to attract customers’ business.
For example, free riding occurs if D uses P’s trademark in D’s banner ads, as a
“trigger” for the ad, when C, using a search engine, keys in P’s trademark, D’s
banner ad appears on the search results page, and C, believing the banner ad
to be P’s banner ad, clicks on it, is taken to D’s web site.
103. Peter S. Sloane, Trademark Vigilance in the Twenty-First Century: A
Pragmatic Approach, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 823, 827
(1999). See also id. at 840 (citing E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967
F.2d 1280, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992)). In order for a company to preserve its
trademark rights it must proactively and reactively stop other companies from
infringing upon its trademark; this is especially important when the infringer
operates in the same market or business area. See id.
104. See id.
105. See Sloane, supra note 103, at 831, 840. The more vigilant a company
is, the stronger its mark will be, thus the less likely that the distinctiveness of
its mark will be diluted, and the less likely such infringement will lead to
abandonment. See id.
106. See Sloane, supra note 103, at 837, 839 (noting that terms such as
aspirin and cellophane became generic because their trademark status was
not preserved by their owners).
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pursues infringers can often persuade a judge that the
company’s trademark deserves to be protected and that a
107
preliminary injunction should be granted.
Another goal of trademark vigilance is to prevent a strong
108
mark from becoming generic. If a trademark becomes generic
109
it is no longer entitled to trademark protection. A trademark
can become generic when the public “decides to use the
trademark to designate not the particular manufacturer’s
brand but the entire product comprising all the competing
110
brands” or when the public “comes to understand the mark to
111
refer only to the kind of goods and not to the origin” of the
goods.
5.

Internet Regulation Generally

The Internet is a “unique and wholly new medium of
112
and courts should be
worldwide human communication,”
careful when attempting to apply established law to Internet
113
In order to facilitate the development of eregulation.
commerce, laws must be applied in light of the realities of the
114
Moreover, in this context, courts must
digital marketplace.
not be too rigid in applying the law; a flexible approach is
115
necessary when dealing with emerging technologies.

107. See id. at 840. (noting that an element of a preliminary injunction is a
showing of irreparable harm, and that it is difficult to show this if the
company allows others to infringe upon its mark).
108. See id.
109. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 321 F.2d
577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963).
110. See id.
111. Quality Inns International, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp.
198, 211 (D. Md. 1988).
112. Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F.
Supp.2d 1070, 1073 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
113. See id.
114. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
115. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1054. See also
supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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II. CASE DESCRIPTION
The District Court held that PEI failed to show that
116
defendants used its trademarks in commerce.
The court
found that “an Internet user cannot conduct a search using the
117
trademark form of the words, i.e., Playboy and Playmate.”
Accordingly, it held only the generic, English form of the words,
i.e., “playboy” and “playmate,” could be used for Internet
searches, and consequently, the defendants were not using
118
The court
PEI’s trademarks in their banner ad packages.
concluded that since the defendants did not use PEI’s
trademarks in commerce, there was no trademark
119
infringement.
The court next assumed that the defendants did use PEI’s
trademarks, but held that PEI failed to demonstrate that the
120
With respect to
use was a violation of the trademark laws.
the trademark infringement claim, the court found that PEI
121
PEI
failed to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion.
attempted to demonstrate the requisite confusion by proposing
that the defendant’s use of its trademarks “Playboy” and
122
The court
“Playmate” caused initial interest confusion.
argued, however, that there could be no confusion because “[a]s
English words, ‘playboy’ and ‘playmate’ cannot be said to
suggest sponsorship or endorsement of either the web sites that
appear as search results . . . or the banner ads that adorn the
123
search results page.” The court then stated that although the
trademarked words were identical to generic, English words,
PEI could not remove words from the English language by
124
Thus, it concluded
acquiring a trademark right in the word.
that PEI failed to establish that the defendants and the users
of the search engine were using PEI’s trademarked words, as
125
opposed to their generic, English word counterparts.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See Playboy Enters., Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at 1076.
Id. at 1073.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1074.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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The District Court also held that PEI failed to establish
that there was trademark dilution, because PEI failed to
126
demonstrate that its trademark was blurred or tarnished.
The court again alluded to the fact that defendants used the
words as generic, English words and not as PEI’s
127
trademarks. As to whether the trademarks were blurred, the
court noted that PEI did not show that defendants’ use of the
words “playboy” and “playmate” “caused any severance of the
®
association between [PEI] and its trademarks Playboy and
®
128
Playmate . . . .”
Thus the court held that PEI failed to
129
establish that the trademarks had been blurred.
With
respect to the tarnishment argument, the court held that PEI
failed to show trademark tarnishment because defendants used
the generic words “playboy” and “playmate,” as opposed to the
trademarked versions, and as such there could not be any
130
The court further reasoned that
trademark tarnishment.
even if defendants used PEI’s trademarked words, PEI would
have to demonstrate that its mark would be harmed by the
131
association with other “purveyors of adult entertainment.”
132
The court held that PEI failed to meet this burden.
III. ANALYSIS
The District Court’s reasoning and application of
traditional trademark law was much too narrow and stringent
for the digital world. The court focused almost entirely on
whether the words used were PEI’s trademarks or if they were
merely generic, English words, and failed to see the underlying
economic realities of the case before it.
Had the court
considered such realities, it would have recognized that the
defendants were using the information structure of the
Internet to misappropriate PEI’s goodwill through their
abusive use of banner ads.

126. See id.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 1075.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 1076. The court noted that PEI could not show harm
because its trademarks are already associated with “purveyors of adult
entertainment” in other marketing channels, (i.e. adult bookstores). See id.
132. See id.
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The District Court’s holding hinged almost entirely on its
finding that the defendants merely used generic, English words
133
as opposed to PEI’s trademarks.
Had the court correctly
analyzed this aspect of the case it would have granted PEI the
134
The court held that only generic, English words
injunction.
135
could be used on the search engines.
Admittedly, one cannot
conduct a search by keying in a trademark per se, but that is,
in effect, what happened. Both the advertisers and the
defendants knew this and counted on it. The defendants
bundled those terms with over 450 other words relating to
adult entertainment into a package to be marketed to
136
purveyors of adult entertainment; this allowed advertisers to
“maximize the efficacy of their ads by targeting consumers
137
However, the
matching a certain demographic profile.”
generic, English meanings of the words “playboy” and
“playmate” are not at all related to adult entertainment: the
definition of the word “playboy” is “a man who pursues a life of
138
pleasure without responsibility or attachments” and the word
“playmate” is defined as “a companion, esp. of a child, in play or
139
Only the trademarked versions of these words
recreation.”
are related to adult entertainment. Given the defendants’ and
advertisers’ motive, to target consumers of adult
entertainment, it is likely that the defendants and advertisers
intended to use the trademarked version of the words.
Two examples, in which the trademarked version of the
words “playboy” or “playmate” were used instead of the generic,
English versions, appear in the analysis of cases involving
domain names and meta-tags. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Calvin Designer Label, PEI sought to enjoin the defendant from
using the domain names: “www.playboyxxx.com” and
140
“www.playmatelive.com.” The court found that the defendant
was using PEI’s trademarks and conducted an extensive

133. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
134. See id. Concerning the trademark dilution claim, the District Court
was correct in determining that PEI could not show trademark tarnishment;
however, the court erred in determining that trademark blurring could not be
shown.
135. See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1081.
136. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
137. See Playboy Enters., Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at 1076.
138. WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY 607 (College Ed. 1997).
139. Id.
140. See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220,
1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
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141

trademark infringement analysis. The Court held that it was
likely that PEI could prove trademark infringement based on
the defendant’s use of PEI’s trademarks in its domain names
142
Yet, the District Court
and properly awarded the injunction.
in the instant case would have such use of the word “playmate”
in
“www.playmatelive.com”
or
“playboy”
in
“www.playboyxxx.com” to be a valid use because the words are
merely generic, English words. Furthermore, in Playboy v.
Welles, defendant Welles used the words “playboy” and
143
The court first
“playmate” in the meta-tags to her web site.
went through the trademark infringement analysis and then it
conducted a lengthy analysis of the fair use of PEI’s
144
Presumably, the court thought that
trademarks by Welles.
the trademarked versions of the words were being used and not
their generic, English counterparts, or it would not have gone
through such analyses. Again, under the present court’s
rationale, PEI would not have been afforded any protection. If
the words “playboy” and “playmate” are recognized as being
trademarks with respect to domain names and meta-tags, for
the law to be consistently applied, they should also be
recognized as trademarks with respect to banner ad use.
If the instant court’s analysis were to stand, then the
purpose behind the trademark laws is effectively undermined.
PEI would not be able to protect the distinctiveness of its
145
trademarks simply because they are generic, English words.
The court stated that PEI cannot trademark words out of the
146
Strictly speaking, no, PEI cannot
English language.
trademark words out of the English language, but this can
create a harsh and unintended result. The court’s reasoning,
taken to its logical conclusion, would render PEI unable to
protect its trademarks under any circumstances. This case
141. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
142. See id.
143. Compare Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Welles, 7 F. Supp.2d 1098 (S.D. Cal.
1998) (holding that defendant is entitled to a “fair use” defense to plaintiff’s
trademark claim for use of meta-tags “playboy” and “playmate”), and Playboy
Enters., Inc., v. Asiafocus, 1998 WL 724000 (E.D. Va. April 10, 1998) (holding
that the defendant’s use of PEI’s trademarks in its meta-tags was a violation
of the federal trademark laws), with Playboy Enters., Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at
1070 (holding that defendants did not use PEI’s trademarks but rather the
common English words “playboy” and “playmate”).
144. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp.2d 1098, 1102-04 (S.D.
Cal. 1998).
145. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
146. See id.
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would also effectively overrule the Welles and Calvin Designer
Label cases, which held that PEI’s trademarks, as opposed to
147
generic, English words, were used by the defendants.
In addition, when evaluating the likelihood of confusion,
the relevant confusion is that experienced by consumers — it is
148
a subjective inquiry. Accordingly, it is irrelevant whether the
court believes that only the generic words can be used on the
149
The relevant question is what the consumer
search engine.
150
believes he or she is searching for.
If the consumer is
searching for something other than adult entertainment, and
intends to use the generic, English versions of the words, then
the banner ads would cause little or no likelihood of confusion.
The user would presumably ignore the banner ads, as well as
PEI’s web sites, and thus there would be no violation of the
trademark laws. However, if the consumer is looking for adult
entertainment, he or she intends to use the trademarked
version of the words, and by including these words in their
advertising packages, the defendants are effectively using PEI’s
trademarks.
Finally, because the Internet is a vast, new medium of
151
courts should use caution
communication and commerce,
152
when trying to apply established doctrines of law to it.
This
court, by holding that the defendants used only the generic,
English versions of the words, chose form over substance, and
given the realities of e-commerce, this is an overly-rigid
153
For the foregoing reasons, the court
application of the law.
erred in holding that the defendants did not use PEI’s
trademark to market its product.
A.

TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS

PEI should succeed on a motion for a preliminary
injunction if the words “playboy” and “playmate” were used as
PEI’s trademarks. To prevail on such a motion, PEI must show
that (1) without an injunction it would suffer irreparable
injury, (2) the scales of hardship tip in its favor, (3) it is likely
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See supra notes 128-46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
See id.
See id.
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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to succeed on the merits, and (4) it is in the public interest to
154
grant the injunction.
In order for PEI to demonstrate a likelihood of success on
the merits it must show three things: (1) its trademark is valid,
(2) the defendant is using the trademark, and (3) such use
155
harms PEI because it is likely to cause customer confusion.
PEI’s registration of its trademark “Playboy” and “Playmate”
with the Principal Register in the Patent and Trademark office
156
As explained above,
establishes that its trademark is valid.
defendants were using PEI’s trademark. Thus, PEI need only
demonstrate that such use would likely cause consumer
confusion to succeed on the merits of its claim.
A court may consider the factors discussed below to
157
determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion.
1.

Similarity of the Trademarks

The words that the defendants used were “playboy” and
“playmate” the words that PEI has trademarked are “Playboy”
158
and “Playmate.” The similarities are so close that it is highly
159
likely that reasonable consumers would confuse the two.
In
fact, when using the defendants’ search engine, a banner ad for
purveyors of adult entertainment would appear regardless of
whether the user keyed in the word with a capital P or a
160
lowercase p. As a result, this factor greatly weighs in favor of
finding a likelihood of confusion.
2.

Relatedness or Proximity of the Products or Services

Both PEI and the advertisers who purchased the
defendants’ services provided on-line adult entertainment for a
fee, and they competed for the same types of Internet users
161
Concededly, the
(those seeking adult entertainment).
defendants’ advertisers provided more explicit and “hardcore”
products and services than PEI, but the proximity of the
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
See supra note 26.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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162

services is undeniable.
Because the services offered by both
PEI and the defendants’ advertisers are closely related, it is
likely that consumers could, in some way, associate the
163
Thus, this factor also
defendants’ advertisers with PEI.
favors the finding that there was a likelihood of consumer
confusion.
3.

Strength of the Plaintiff’s Mark

Generally, the stronger the trademark is the more
164
PEI’s marks were registered, used
protection it is entitled.
for a long time, widely advertised, well known in its industry,
165
All of the above
and had a descriptive secondary meaning.
suggest that the mark is a strong one, and as such is entitled to
166
a great deal of protection.
In addition, because PEI’s
trademarks are so well known and its services so diverse,
consumers may be confused as to what services it actually
167
If a banner ad displaying adult entertainment-related
offers.
content appears when the user searches for PEI’s services, the
consumer may mistake the advertiser’s services for PEI’s
services.
4.

The Relationship Between the Parties’ Marketing
Channels

Because the defendant’s advertisers advertised on the
168
Moreover,
Internet, the likelihood of confusion is increased.
it is much easier to become confused as to what the source of
the banner ad is when the defendants’ advertisers place their
advertisements on PEI’s search results page, especially since
169
PEI and the advertisers have overlapping audiences.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
See id.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
See id.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
See id.
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The Degree of Care Likely to be Exercised by Consumers

Because the services provided by both PEI and the
defendants’ advertisers are relatively inexpensive, consumers
will likely be less discerning and more easily confused by the
170
defendants’ use of PEI’s trademarks.
6.

The Defendant’s Intent in Selecting the Trademark

The defendants chose to include the words “playboy” and
“playmate” in its group of 450 words related to adult
entertainment because PEI is well known in the adult
entertainment industry. The defendants intended to use PEI’s
trademark and reputation to help target the demographic
171
As stated before,
profile that their advertisers were seeking.
the ordinary meaning of these words has nothing to do with
adult entertainment, and the fact that they were grouped with
the other 450 words related to adult entertainment indicates
that the defendants intended to use PEI’s reputation and
172
This factor weighs in favor
trademarks to sell their product.
of PEI in that it appears as though the defendants intended to
cause some consumer confusion.
7.

Actual Confusion

Although actual confusion was not shown here, this alone
does not prevent a plaintiff from prevailing when the other
173
factors point to a likelihood of confusion.
After considering the above factors, it appears that PEI can
successfully demonstrate a likelihood of confusion.
PEI would also likely establish that the defendants created
initial interest confusion, the alternative method of
174
Initial interest
establishing a likelihood of confusion.
confusion “occurs when a competitor lures potential customers
by initially passing off its goods as those of another, even if
confusion as to the source of goods is dispelled by the time the

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
See id.
See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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sales are completed.”
By including the words “playboy” and
“playmate” in their advertising packages, defendants enabled
other adult entertainment companies to lure customers to their
sites by initially passing off their sites as PEI’s site or related
176
The initial interest confusion occurs when search
to PEI.
engine users key-in “playboy” or “playmate” looking for PEI or
PEI related sites, and find a banner ad on the search results
page. Because both PEI and the banner ad provide on-line
adult entertainment, the user may initially believe the banner
ad is PEI’s or connected with PEI. Even if the user goes to the
advertisers’ site and discovers that it is not PEI’s site or
connected with PEI, the initial confusion as to whom the
advertisement was for, is enough to be actionable under the
177
doctrine of initial interest confusion.
The defendants are essentially using PEI’s reputation to
attract new customers. This type of activity is prohibited by
178
federal trademark laws, as well as unfair competition laws.
The concern is that once a user is at the defendants’
advertisers’ web site he or she will be content with staying on
that site instead of continuing to search for PEI’s web site.
Moreover, as explained above, with respect to less expensive
products, the degree of consumer care may be correspondingly
179
When the user searching for PEI’s site sees a banner
lower.
ad advertising adult entertainment, he or she may immediately
180
“click” on the banner ad assuming that it is related to PEI.
Thus, PEI can demonstrate a likelihood of confusion by either
applying the factors listed above or by using the theory of
initial interest confusion.
By possessing valid trademarks and showing that the
defendants used the trademarks, and by establishing a
likelihood of confusion, it is likely that PEI would succeed on
the merits of the case. However, in order to win on the motion
for an injunction, the court must find that the relative harm to
PEI, if the injunction is denied, exceeds the harm to the
181
If the motion is
defendants if the injunction is granted.
granted, the cost to the defendants is minimal; they will merely

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See Eli Lilly & Co., 86 F. Supp.2d at 845.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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sell their package to advertisers minus the words “playboy” and
“playmate.” The defendants may incur some reprogramming
and recall fees, but in total, the cost is de minimus. They will
probably continue to sell as many packages to advertisers as
before. In contrast, if the injunction is denied, the cost to PEI
will be much greater. PEI would see a decrease in the number
of users of its web site (and the resulting business) and, more
importantly, a decrease in the strength of two of its main
182
trademarks, or the risk of those marks becoming generic.
PEI has spent the last fifty years and millions of dollars
183
creating a name for itself and building up goodwill, and if the
court denies the injunction, it could all be for nothing if PEI’s
trademarks become generic or weaker.
Consequently, it
appears as though the scales of hardship will tip in favor of
PEI.
Thus, PEI can both establish a likelihood of success on the
merits and show undue hardship; this, along with the
presumption of suffering irreparable harm and being in the
public interest, should be sufficient for the court to have
granted the motion for a preliminary injunction on the
trademark infringement claim.
B.

TRADEMARK DILUTION ANALYSIS

PEI also alleged that placing banner ads for other
purveyors of adult entertainment on PEI’s search results page
184
PEI argued that
tarnishes or dilutes PEI’s trademarks.
defendants’ banner ads diminished PEI’s ability to distinguish
185
Trademark dilution occurs when (1)
and identify its goods.
defendants’ used trademarks that are sufficiently similar to
PEI’s trademarks as to cause a consumer mental association of
the two that (2) caused (3) actual economic harm to PEI’s
trademarks’ economic value by decreasing its selling power as
186
“The
an advertising agent for PEI’s goods and services.
prohibition on dilution is intended to ‘protect the trademark

182. See supra Section I(B)(4): Trademark Dilution Analysis (explaining
how a trademark becomes generic).
183. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F.
Supp.2d 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
184. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
185. See id.
186. See 15 U.S.C. §1127 (2001); Playboy Enters., Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at
1075.
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owner from the erosion of the distinctiveness and prestige of a
trademark caused by the sale of other goods or services under
the same name . . . , even though there is no confusion as to
187
It is highly likely that the defendants’ use of PEI’s
source.’”
trademark to create a banner ad on PEI’s search results page
caused a consumer to make a mental association between the
two products or services. As mentioned earlier, PEI is one of
the largest providers of adult entertainment, and it provides
many services; a banner ad appearing on PEI’s search results
page could reasonably lead consumers to believe that it was
188
Whether or not this association between the
related to PEI.
banner ads and PEI caused PEI’s trademark to lose economic
value depends on whether such banner ads tarnished or
189
blurred PEI’s trademarks.
Trademark tarnishment would occur if PEI’s trademarks
were improperly associated with an inferior or offensive
190
However, the defendants did not tarnish
product or service.
191
PEI’s trademarks by linking them to the banner ads.
PEI
claimed that the banner ads advertised explicit and hardcore
adult entertainment, which, because of the link to PEI’s
trademarks, improperly associated the trademarks with an
192
Yet, PEI’s magazines
inferior or offensive product or service.
are often in adult bookstores, which carry explicit and hardcore
adult entertainment; this fact tends to undermine PEI’s
193
tarnishment argument.
Trademark blurring would occur if the defendants used
PEI’s trademarks to identify the defendants’ goods and
194
PEI’s trademarks were blurred by the banner ads:
services.
“[d]ilution by blurring occurs where customers or prospective
customers see the plaintiff’s mark on a ‘plethora of different
goods and services,’ thus potentially diluting and weakening
the mark’s ability to serve as a unique identifier of one source –

187. Eli Lilly & Co., 86 F. Supp.2d at 847 (citing Illinois High School Ass’n
v. GTE Vontage, Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir. 1996)).
188. See Playboy Enters., Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at 1076.
189. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
190. See id. See also Eli Lilly & Co., 86 F. Supp.2d at 851 (noting that
trademark tarnishment occurs when a trademark is associated with poor
quality products, portrayed in an unwholesome light, or can no longer be a
“wholesome identifier” of the plaintiff’s products).
191. See Playboy Enters., Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at 1072.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 1076.
194. See id. at 1075.
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195

the plaintiff’s product.”
By linking the ads of other adult
entertainment providers to PEI’s trademark, the defendants
caused their search engine users to associate PEI’s mark with
196
the web sites of the other providers of adult entertainment.
PEI is likely to succeed on the merits of the trademark dilution
claim because it can establish that the defendants’ use of the
words “playboy” and “playmate” in their advertisement
packages would cause a mental association with PEI’s marks,
which would cause economic harm to PEI’s trademarks.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act grants preliminary
injunctive relief when it is demonstrated that (1) the plaintiff
will likely succeed on the merits, (2) absent an injunction the
plaintiff may suffer irreparable injury, (3) the scale of hardship
tips in the plaintiff’s favor, and (4) it is in the public interest to
197
grant the injunction. The fact that it is likely that PEI would
succeed on the merits with regard to the trademark dilution
198
This
claim would tip the scales of hardship in PEI’s favor.
combined with the presumptions that without the injunction
199
PEI would suffer irreparable harm and that it is in the public
200
interest to grant the injunction, leads to the conclusion that
PEI should have been granted a motion for a preliminary
injunction for the trademark dilution claim.
The District Court failed to reach the correct decision with
respect to both the trademark dilution claim and the
trademark infringement claim. Thus, because the defendant
infringed on and diluted PEI’s trademarks, a preliminary
injunction should have been granted on these grounds.
C.

LEGALITY OF BANNER ADS ANALYSIS

Having established that the defendants’ use of the banner
ads infringed on and diluted PEI’s trademarks, this section will
now set forth legal, economic, and policy reasons for why the
use of banner ad keying should be restricted. First, this section
195. See Eli Lilly & Co., 86 F. Supp.2d at 851.
196. See Playboy Enters., Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at 1072.
197. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
198. See supra Section III(B): Trademark Dilution Analysis.
199. See Alta Vista Corp.Ltd., 44 F. Supp.2d at 75 (citing Camel Hair and
Cashmere Inst. of America, Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d 6, 12
(1st Cir. 1986)).
200. See id. (citing Hypertherm, Inc. v. Precision Products, Inc., 832 F.2d
697, 700 (1st Cir. 1987)). See also Calamari Fisheries, Inc. v. The Village
Catch, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 994, 1015 (D. Mass. 1988).
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will analogize the practice of banner ad keying with the
practice of meta-tag use, and argue that it should be restricted
in the same way meta-tag use has been restricted. Second, it
will examine economic reasons for restricting the practice of
banner ad keying. Third, it will consider policy reasons for
restricting the practice of banner ad keying.
1.

Legal Reasons for Restricting the Practice of Banner Ad
Keying

Banner ads, especially as they are offered by the
defendants, are the functional equivalent of a meta-tag. To
compare the illegal use of meta-tags to the illegal use of banner
201
ads, this comment will use the facts of Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Asiafocus Int’l, Inc. and the facts of Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Netscape Communications, Inc. Asiafocus was a company that
202
The company
primarily sold adult entertainment products.
embedded PEI’s trademarks into its meta-tags such that when
a search engine user keyed in the word “playboy” or
“playmate,” Asiafocus’ web site address would appear near
203
Asiafocus was found to have
PEI’s web site address.
“purposefully employed deceptive tactics to attract consumers
to their Web site under the guise that their sites are sponsored
204
Similarly, the banner
by or somehow affiliated with PEI.”
ads set up by Netscape, Excite, and the purveyors of adult
entertainment, are also triggered by the words “playboy” and
205
When such words are keyed in by a search
“playmate.”
engine user, the search engine, like in a meta-tag scenario, will
206
The difference though, is
search for the words in its index.
that instead of searching its entire World Wide Web index, as it

201. Not all use of meta-tags or banner ads is illegal. See Brian Kennan,
Diverting Traffic on the Web, 579 PLI/Pat 84, 94 (1999). It is only illegal when
the placing of information in the meta-tags or the banner ads causes confusion
as to the source or content of the web site or banner ad, which generally occurs
when a competitor’s trademark is used in the meta-tag or banner ad. See
Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Asiafocus, 1998 WL 724000, at *6 (E.D. Va. April 10,
1998) (citing 15 U.S.C. §1125 (a)(1)(A), (B)).
202. See Playboy Enters., Inc., 1998 WL 724000, at *2.
203. See id. at *3.
204. Kennan, supra note 195, at 85-86 (citing Playboy Enters., Inc., 1998
WL 72400, at * 3).
205. See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Communications, Inc., 55 F.
Supp.2d 1070, 1071 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
206. See id.

2001]

BANNER AD KEYING

193

would in a meta-tag scenario, the search engine would only
207
search its index of banner ads. Moreover, rather than placing
a web site address of an adult entertainment purveyor next to
PEI’s web site address on the search results page, the search
208
Thus,
engine would instead place a banner ad on such page.
both banner ads and meta-tags operate in a similar manner to
accomplish the goal of directing traffic to the defendants’ web
sites.
Generally, the use of another’s trademark in one’s metatag does not comport with the Fair Use Doctrine under the
209
The only situations in which such use of
Lanham Act.
another’s trademark is legal is (1) when it is the truthful use of
the trademark, for example, to identify one’s products or
services, and (2) when it is used in comparative
210
Given that banner ads and meta-tags are
advertisements.
functional equivalents, logically banner ads should be subject to
the same sort of restrictions that meta-tags are subject to.
Thus, when banner ads use trademarks, as the defendants did,
they should be limited to identifying one’s products or
comparative advertisements.
2.

Economic Reasons for Restricting the Practice of Banner
Ad Keying

The problem with meta-tags is that they permit the
misappropriation of the trademark holder’s goodwill. An
example would be a situation in which a user searches for
company X’s electronic equipment; company Y, a competitor,
includes company X’s name in its meta-tag such that when the
search results page is displayed, the user will see Y’s web site
address in front of or next to X’s web site address. If the user
selects Y’s site, believing it to be X’s site, Y has
misappropriated X’s goodwill. As noted in Section III(C)(1),
banner ads work in a similar manner, except that instead of
comparing the web sites of X and Y, it compares X’s web site to
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1036.
210. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. An example of a
truthful use is Ms. Welles’ use of the trademarks Playboy and Playmate to
describe herself. See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Welles, 7 F. Supp.2d 1098, 1105
(S.D. Cal. 1998). An example of a comparative advertisement would be a Visa
commercial, explaining that a certain company will not take American
Express cards.
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Y’s banner ad. If a user goes to the banner ad, believing that it
is associated with X, Y has misappropriated X’s goodwill. The
misappropriation of another’s goodwill is known as free
211
Trademark law seeks to prevent free riding, and
riding.
trademark holders have the right to enjoin others from
212
committing such misrepresentations.
If the District Court’s ruling in the instant case were
allowed to stand, consider the impact it would have on
trademark holders and would-be trademark infringers.
Trademark holders would be hesitant to participate in, or fully
utilize e-commerce, and if they did, they would have a lot less
incentive to develop new products or increase the value of their
goodwill knowing that competitors can capitalize on their
213
research and development efforts. Would-be infringers would
also have less incentive to develop products, because it is more
cost efficient to appropriate the goodwill and reputation of their
214
As a result, the growth of the digital economy
competitors.
would suffer and the purpose of intellectual property law will
215
have been severely undermined.
3.

Policy Reasons for Restricting the Practice of Banner Ad
Keying

In the long run, the court’s ruling could have a devastating
impact on trademark holders by decreasing the strength of
216
their trademarks. If competitors are allowed to use a holder’s
trademark, over time the trademark will lose its distinctiveness
and become diluted, and thus subject to abandonment or the
217
It is very important for trademark holders
defense of laches.
218
to be vigilant; however, holdings such as the one rendered in
this court effectively prevent trademark holders from doing so.
If searches are not considered searches for trademarks, but for
generic, English words, trademark holders will not be able to

211. See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 305; Weight Watchers Int’l,
Inc., 744 F. Supp. at 1269.
212. See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 305; Weight Watchers Int’l,
Inc., 744 F. Supp. at 1269; TMT North America, Inc., 124 F.3d at 881.
213. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 25.
216. See Sloane, supra note 103, at 837-38.
217. See Sloane, supra note 99 and accompanying text.
218. See Sloane, supra note 103, at 839.
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protect their trademarks in the Internet environment. Also, if
sometime in the future, trademark holders do show trademark
infringement, they still may be denied a preliminary injunction
because it is difficult to show irreparable harm when there is
219
delay.
Trademark holders, in PEI’s situation, must also be wary
220
In the long run, the
of their trademarks becoming generic.
holding in this case would easily lead to the public
understanding PEI’s trademarks “playboy” or “playmate” to
refer to adult entertainment. In fact, the court accelerates this
process by implying that the generic meaning of these words is
already associated with adult entertainment. If Internet users
key-in the words “playboy” or “playmate” and the search results
page displays a banner ad for adult entertainment, they will
eventually begin to associate the two together. This process is
compounded because of the number of purveyors of adult
221
entertainment
subscribing
to
defendants’
services
(presumably each time a user would type in “playboy” or
“playmate” using defendants’ search engine an ad for a
different adult entertainment web-site would appear).
Providing an atmosphere where e-commerce can grow and
flourish is perhaps the most important reason for restricting
the use of banner ad keying. E-commerce will play a major role
in the future of our economy and the law should provide, to the
extent possible, consistency and fair regulation. Courts should
apply established legal doctrine to the regulation of ecommerce, but it should be flexible and the underlying
222
economic reality should be considered.
CONCLUSION
The District Court erred by concluding that the words
“playboy” and “playmate” were used in their generic, English
sense. The court’s interpretation of these words is inconsistent
with the interpretations in other cases and was likely due to
the court’s unusually rigid application of traditional trademark
law in the Internet context. As a result, the remainder of the
court’s analysis with respect to both the trademark
219. See id.
220. See King-Seeley Thermos Co., 321 F.2d at 579.
221. See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Communications, Inc., 55 F.
Supp.2d 1070, 1072 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
222. See id. at 1073; Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1054.
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infringement and dilution issues was also erroneous. The
court’s decision could significantly slow the growth of ecommerce both by deterring business participation in the
digital economy and by encouraging free riding. Laws and
policies governing e-commerce must be catered toward
businesses because, as noted before, e-commerce will be led by
business, while the government plays only a minor role in its
development. What does this all mean? It means that ecommerce must be allowed to develop in a market-driven
environment, unhampered by intrusive regulation and
stringently — as well as inconsistently — applied law. Because
of the court’s flawed analysis and the consequent negative
impact on the development of e-commerce, the holding in this
case should be overruled. Accordingly, based on the analysis
presented above, a preliminary injunction should be granted to
PEI.
In addition, consistent with the rationale behind the
general presumption of illegality of meta-tags, the purpose of
the Lanham Act and trademark law generally, and the policy
reasons put forth above, banner ad keying, like meta-tags,
should be subject to the fair use doctrine.

